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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Confidential sources serve a key role in private securities fraud 
litigation, meritorious and otherwise. Allowing plaintiffs to withhold 
a source’s identity at the pleading stage allows insiders to expose 
securities fraud without fear of reprisal.1 At the same time, a 
fabricated confidential source stands as a tempting shortcut for the 
plaintiff who hopes to bypass the heightened pleading requirements 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)2 and “use 
discovery merely as a fishing expedition in the hope that something 
will turn up.”3
                                                                                                                                       
 * J.D., with Highest Honors, Florida State University College of Law, 2010; B.S., 
with honors, University of Florida, 2005. The Author thanks Professor Barbara Banoff for 
her valuable comments and guidance in the development of an earlier draft of this Note. 
The Author also thanks Nathan Paulich and Jayne Ashley Ross Phillips for their 
thoughtful insights and review.  
 1. See Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing 
Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 554-56 (2007). 
 2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).   
 3. In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
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 Congress enacted PSLRA in 1995 with the stated legislative aim 
of combating frivolous securities litigation.4 Toward this end, PSLRA 
included a range of changes to the process of pursuing securities 
litigation,5 not the least of which was a heightening of applicable 
pleading standards.6 PSLRA consequently did not provide identical 
standards for pleading the various aspects of securities fraud. 
Rather, it provided one standard for pleading the required state of 
mind (scienter)7 and another for pleading falsity.8 This Note will 
focus on the latter of those two standards. Congress raised the 
standard for pleading falsity by adding the following provisions to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934:9
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions 
(1) Misleading statements and omissions 
In any private action arising under [the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934] in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant— 
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or 
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
in which they were made, not misleading; 
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or 
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall 
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.10
 It further provides that “the court shall, on the motion of any 
defendant, dismiss the complaint if the [pleading] requirements . . . 
are not met” and that “all discovery and other proceedings shall be 
stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss.”11
 As a practical matter, PSLRA’s requirements for pleading falsity 
along with the still applicable requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b)12 create a unique set of limitations and opportunities 
that make the use of confidential sources simultaneously more 
                                                                                                                                       
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31. 
 5. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) (providing for, among other things, 
changes to the class certification process, appointment of a lead plaintiff, heightened 
pleading standards, and limitations on damages in securities fraud litigation brought 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 6. See id. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2). 
 7. See id. § 78u-4(b)(2). In the context of a securities fraud case, the requisite state of 
mind is intention to deceive. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 
588, 593 (2001); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—Federal § 1194 (2008).
 8. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006). 
 10. § 78u-4(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A)-(B). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (providing that when “alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”). 
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appealing and more complicated. While the recent Supreme Court 
decision Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. provides some 
insight on the use of confidential sources in the pleading of scienter,13
there remains considerably less consensus on their use in pleading 
falsity. This Note explores the evolution of courts’ approaches to the 
use of confidential sources to plead falsity, special concerns regarding 
fabricated sources, and the potential pitfalls of the existing analysis. 
In the end, this Note proposes a revised process for evaluating 
confidential sources. 
 Part I examines PSLRA’s legislative background as well as its 
early judicial interpretation as it relates to the use of confidential 
sources to show falsity. Part II begins with an overview of Novak v. 
Kasaks,14 the landmark case that rejected the notion that PSLRA 
summarily precludes the use of unnamed sources in securities fraud 
cases. It continues with an exploration of the adoption of Novak 
throughout the circuits and the three approaches that have emerged: 
the original Novak approach, the holistic approach, and a more 
permissive version of the holistic approach. Part III examines the 
fabrication concerns inherent in the assessment of confidential 
sources. It then looks at the potential evaluative pitfalls that stem 
from those concerns including impermissible judicial evaluations of 
source reliability and credibility at the pleading stage. Finally, Part 
III argues for a two-step process where courts would look first for 
adequate assurances that unnamed sources are not fabricated. If 
adequate assurances are found, only then would a court evaluate the 
sufficiency of the facts pled with the level of judicial skepticism 
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II.   BACKGROUND
A.   Legislative Background 
 In contrast to the atmosphere in which Congress passed the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 PSLRA was enacted amidst 
outspoken congressional concern that securities litigation had 
become excessive and harmful.  
                                                                                                                                       
 13. See 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (holding that to survive the pleadings stage, an 
inference of scienter must not only be plausible but also at least as strong as competing 
inferences); see also infra Part IV.B.1 discussing the implications of Tellabs.
 14. 26 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 15. Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with an eye toward curbing 
harms caused by market manipulation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2006) (“National 
emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of trade, 
transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect 
the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and 
sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on 
such exchanges and markets . . . .”).  
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There is broad agreement on the need for reform. Shareholders’ 
groups, corporate America, the SEC, and many lawyers want to 
curb these abusive practices.  
Lawyers who bring meritorious suits do not benefit when 
strikesuit artists wreak havoc on the Nation’s boardrooms  
and courthouses.  
Our economy does not benefit when the threat of litigation 
deters capital formation.16
 Specifically, congressional supporters of the Act pointed to harm 
caused by meritless lawsuits filed against corporations and others 
with “deep pocket[s]” in response to any significant decline in stock 
price, irrespective of the defendants’ culpability.17 These suits, the 
Conference Committee Report posited, abused the potentially costly 
discovery process with minimal hope of uncovering facts to support a 
cause of action and forced defendants into coerced settlements.18 It 
further noted the harms arising from discovery being used as a 
“fishing expedition” during which the target company’s documents 
are scoured for statements or actions which can be tenuously 
assembled into a claim.19
 Congress intended PSLRA “to establish a uniform and stringent 
pleading requirement.”20 Even before PSLRA’s enactment, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) already established a more onerous 
pleading standard for fraud by requiring that allegations of fraud 
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”21
Although PSLRA is broader in scope than the explicit requirements of 
Rule 9(b), its provisions represent a clarification and codification of 
existing case law in some federal circuits. PSLRA’s requirement that a 
complaint specify why allegedly false or misleading statements are 
false or misleading closely parallels Rule 9(b)’s insistence on stating 
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.22 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                       
 16. Sec. Litig. Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 8-9 
(1995) (statement of Sen. Alfonse M. D’Amato, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs); see also id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Member, S. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs) (“The flaws in the current private securities 
litigation system are simply too obvious to deny. The record is replete with examples of 
how the system is being abused and misused.”). While a great deal of legislative sentiment 
had coalesced around this principle, a majority of support for PSLRA came from the newly 
elected Republican majority. See 141 CONG. REC. 37,807, 38,354 (1995). Notable critics of 
the Act include former president Bill Clinton, see 141 CONG. REC. 37,797-98 (1995), over 
whose veto PSLRA was ultimately enacted. See 141 CONG. REC. 37,807, 38,354.
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.  
 18. Id.
 19. Id. at 37, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730. 
 20. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 22. Prior to PSLRA’s passage, Rule 9(b)’s broad requirement of “the circumstances 
constituting fraud” had been interpreted along the lines explicitly spelled out in PSLRA. 
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PSLRA’s requirement that a statement of all particularized facts 
accompany allegations made on information and belief largely codifies 
the pre-PSLRA application of Rule 9(b) to information and belief 
pleading.23 Prior to the Act, courts held that plaintiffs could not satisfy 
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement as to fraud with allegations 
based on information and belief.24 The exception was the situation in 
which the matters in question were uniquely within the defendant’s 
knowledge and of which a plaintiff would not be expected to have 
personal knowledge.25 Even when this exception applied, a plaintiff 
had to put forth facts that supported his or her belief.26 Congress 
designed these areas of overlap to eliminate inconsistencies arising 
from different interpretations of Rule 9(b) across the various circuits.27
B.   Early Application of PSLRA to Pleading Falsity with 
Confidential Sources  
 Not surprisingly, PSLRA’s requirement that a plaintiff plead “all 
facts” on which they based information and belief claims gave rise to 
a knotty problem when complaints relied on confidential sources in 
their allegations of falsity. Courts initially wrestled with how far “all 
facts” should extend and the degree to which it encompasses the 
identity of confidential sources at the pleading stage, finally settling 
on a literal reading.28 In support of this interpretation, some courts 
                                                                                                                                       
See, e.g., Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that Plaintiffs 
satisfied the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) by “set[ing] out the representations on 
which they relied, stating both what financial figures they were given and what they 
alleged the true financial figures were[;] . . . specif[ying] who was alleged to have made the 
false statements; and . . . stat[ing] the precise dates and places of the meetings at which 
they alleged the fraudulent statements were made”); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (“To satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), a complaint must 
adequately specify the statements it claims were false or misleading, give particulars as to 
the respect in which plaintiff contends the statements were fraudulent, state when and 
where the statements were made, and identify those responsible for the statements.”). 
 23. Plaintiffs plead facts on information and belief when they do not have direct 
knowledge, but have been informed of the facts in question and believe them to be true. See 
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997); United 
States v. Twenty-Five Barrels of Alcohol, 18 F. Cas. 252, 256 (E.D. Mo. 1868). 
 24. See, e.g., Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993); Stern v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1991); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 
822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 54 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 25. See, e.g., Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672. 
 26. See, e.g., id.
 27. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 
(“The courts of appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways, creating distinctly 
different pleading standards among the circuits. The Committee does not adopt a new and 
untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the 
Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second 
Circuit.”). 
 28. See Party City Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 282, 304-05 (D.N.J. 2001); Novak v. 
Kasaks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
970 F. Supp. 746, 763-64 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
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cited congressional rejection of an amendment to PSLRA that would 
have lowered plaintiffs’ pleading burden as an indication that 
Congress intended for plaintiffs to name their confidential sources.29
III.   ACCEPTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
A.   Novak v. Kasaks
 The interpretation of “all facts” as precluding confidential sources 
was ultimately not widely adopted. The Second Circuit in Novak v. 
Kasaks30 applied a more flexible approach to PSLRA’s particularity 
requirement and established a mechanism by which a complaint 
could survive a motion to dismiss without naming confidential 
sources.31 Initially, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
complaint for insufficient particularity, citing PSLRA’s “all facts” 
requirement for allegations based on information and belief.32
 On appeal, the Second Circuit characterized the policy reasoning 
that underpinned the district court’s ruling, as well as that relied 
upon by the defense,33 as a “misreading” of PSLRA’s legislative 
history based on merely “hyperbolic statements of legislators 
attempting (unsuccessfully) to amend the proposed [a]ct . . . .”34 It 
further reasoned that, from a practical standpoint, Congress must 
not have intended PSLRA’s “all facts” to be applied literally.35 The 
court rationalized,  
Reading “all” literally would produce illogical results . . . . [I]t 
would allow complaints to survive dismissal where “all” the facts 
                                                                                                                                       
 29. See Party City Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 305; Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. 
at 763-64. Arguing in support of the rejected amendment in question, Representative 
Dingell noted that without it, “you must literally, in your pleadings, include the names of 
confidential informants . . . .” 141 CONG. REC. 7277 (1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell). It is 
noteworthy that the amendment in question related to scienter and not to the pleading of 
falsity. See 141 CONG. REC. 7276 (1995) (statement of Rep. Bryant). 
 30. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 31. Id. at 314. In Novak, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ statements 
regarding Ann Taylor Stores Corporation’s ongoing financial health were false in light of 
the company’s “Box and Hold” practice. Id. at 304. This practice allowed the company to 
enhance its appearance of profitability by warehousing obsolete, unsold merchandise 
rather than marking it down for sale and recording the loss. Id. In pleading facts related to 
the warehousing practices, the plaintiffs relied on confidential sources familiar with the 
operation. See id. at 304-05. 
 32. Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff’s 
complaint “provides none of the required facts underlying the complaint’s allegations . . . 
nor does it direct the Court to where those facts might be found,” and further that “[i]f, in 
fact, these unnamed ‘consultants’ provided information forming the basis for these 
allegations, then the consultants should have been named in the complaint”).  
 33. On appeal, the defendants cited Silicon Graphics and several similarly reasoned 
out-of-circuit opinions to support their contention that plaintiffs must identify confidential 
sources in PSLRA pleadings. Novak, 216 F.3d at 313.
 34. Id. (noting that despite attempts to include such an amendment, the ultimate 
enactment does not require plaintiffs to name sources). 
 35. Id. at 314 n.1. 
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supporting the plaintiff’s information and belief were pled, but 
those facts were patently insufficient to support that belief. 
Equally peculiarly, it would require dismissal where the complaint 
pled facts fully sufficient to support a convincing inference if any 
known facts were omitted.36
 Most significantly, while noting PSLRA’s legislative objective of 
reducing frivolous and abusive strike suits,37 the Second Circuit 
posited that a per se rule requiring plaintiffs to name sources could 
deter informants from cooperating with investigators in meritorious 
securities fraud cases.38 Accordingly, the court held that the most 
reasonable interpretation of “all facts” is that plaintiffs need only 
plead “sufficient facts” to support the beliefs upon which they base 
their allegations and need not always reveal confidential sources.39
 Having abstractly held that plaintiffs need not always identify 
their confidential sources, the Second Circuit outlined two distinct 
paths by which a complaint that includes confidential sources can 
overcome a motion to dismiss. The first path allows sources to remain 
unnamed when “other facts . . . provide an adequate basis for 
believing that the defendants’ statements were false.”40 That is, if the 
complaint would otherwise survive a motion to dismiss based 
exclusively on other facts pled, the court will not require the plaintiff 
to name confidential sources. The alternative path requires 
identification of the source “with sufficient particularity to support 
the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source 
would possess the information alleged.”41
 The Second Circuit’s analysis did not expressly indicate whether 
the two avenues for satisfying PSLRA’s heightened pleading 
standards with confidential sources were to be examined separately 
or together.42 Novak did not indicate that the test is always 
disjunctive, nor did it specifically foreclose a holistic analysis which 
allows for satisfaction of pleading requirements through a 
combination of the two options.43
                                                                                                                                       
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 306-07. 
 38. Id. at 314 (“Imposing a general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources 
serves no legitimate pleading purpose while it could deter informants from providing critical 
information to investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them.”). 
 39. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis omitted). 
 40. Id. at 314. 
 41. Id.
 42. See id. 
 43. Nevertheless, the language of Novak suggests that the court established a 
disjunctive test which could be satisfied only by one path or the other and not by a holistic 
combination of the two. First, it is significant that the court left the phrase “other facts” 
undefined. See id. Had its analysis envisioned a holistic approach, the court could have 
easily clarified that “other facts” may include a description of the sources along the lines of 
the second path. Such an instruction would have effectively merged the two options. 
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B.   Application of Novak
 While their analyses take different forms and encompass different 
factors, most circuits that have addressed the issue have adopted the 
fundamental aspects of Novak.44 Even where courts apply Novak
differently, several key aspects are in harmony throughout the 
circuits. More specifically, courts in most circuits have universally 
accepted Novak’s central premise that PSLRA’s “all facts” 
requirement does not per se require that plaintiffs name confidential 
sources.45 Similarly, there has been broad recognition of PSLRA’s 
dual, competing policy objectives of combating frivolous strike suits 
while encouraging meritorious securities fraud claims.46
 Despite broad acceptance of Novak’s fundamental underpinnings, 
three different applications of Novak have emerged throughout the 
circuits—the original Novak approach, the holistic approach, and the 
permissive holistic approach. The approaches primarily differ in the 
extent to which they consider the two paths available for a complaint 
to meet PSLRA’s pleading requirement without naming confidential 
sources holistically or separately.  
1.   The Original Novak Approach
 The original Novak approach, developed in the Second Circuit,47
has been adopted by the Fourth,48 Fifth,49 and Seventh50 Circuits. 
                                                                                                                                       
Additionally, the court introduces the second option with the transition “[m]oreover, even if 
personal sources must be identified . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). This if/then structure 
suggests that the description of sources path should only be considered once the “other 
facts” avenue has proven unsatisfactory. Further, because the case was remanded to the 
district court for reconsideration in light of the appellate court’s instructions, the lack of 
guidance on how to weigh each path suggests that the court of appeals intended the two to 
be considered separately. See id.
 44. Wohl, supra note 1, at 559-60 (noting that the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits endorse Novak).
 45. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2007); Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2006); Sparling v. Daou, 397 F.3d 
704, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2005); Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2004); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003); Mesko v. 
Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29 (1st Cir. 2002); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. 
Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 351 (5th Cir. 2002); In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 
881 (D. Minn. 2007); D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 739 (E.D. Mich. 
2003); In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2000).  
 46. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 477 F.3d at 171-72; Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d at 596; Cal.
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 146-47; Adams, 340 F.3d at 1095, 1099-1100; Cabletron,
311 F.3d at 30; ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group, 291 F.3d at 354; Novak, 216 F.3d at 306, 
314; D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 754 n.28; In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig.,
105 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.  
 47. 997 F. Supp. 425. See also In re Scottish Re Group Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370, 
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Feasby v. Industri-Matematik Int’l Corp., No. 99 Civ. 8761 
(LTS)(JCF), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22791, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003).  
 48. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 477 F.3d at 174 (proposing a “case-by-case assessment” of all 
facts or, “[w]hen the complaint chooses to rely on facts provided by confidential sources,” a 
separate assessment mirroring the second suggested path of Novak).  
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This approach simply applies the analysis used in Novak without 
analytical embellishment or structural adjustments. Although Novak 
did not specifically call for the analysis to be separate, courts 
purporting to adhere directly to its approach have interpreted it as 
such. Unlike the more holistic approach discussed in the next 
Section, the original Novak approach does not consider a totality of 
facts encompassing both Novak paths together. Rather, it looks at 
each option separately and independently of the other. Under this 
approach, a plaintiff cannot meet the pleading standard by 
combining facts from nonconfidential sources with a description of 
his or her confidential source suggesting that the source would have 
access to the information in question—the plaintiff must satisfy one 
path or the other. In Tellabs, for example, the Seventh Circuit made 
it clear that it considers the two paths separately by holding that 
plaintiffs must “describe their sources with sufficient particularity ‘to 
support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the 
source would possess the information alleged,’ or in the alternative
provide other evidence to support their allegations.”51
 Although courts in this first group have not elaborated on the 
basic Novak analysis, they have provided some guidance on when a 
plaintiff has or has not sufficiently described his or her confidential 
sources. Courts in this camp have rejected complaints which fail to 
provide any description or provide only nominal, boilerplate 
descriptions such as an indication that the confidential sources were 
discovered through “plaintiffs’ investigation.”52 Generic job 
descriptions such as “director”53 and even specific titles such as 
“Supervisor of Insurance Accounting” or “Executive of Pricing”54 have 
also been found insufficient to satisfy the pleading standard. Courts 
in this group have been more willing to accept descriptions that 
provide dates of employment, job responsibilities, and the manner in 
which the source came to know the information.55
                                                                                                                                       
 49. Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 259 (5th Cir. 2005); ABC Arbitrage 
Plaintiffs Group, 291 F.3d at 353; In re Fleming Cos. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 5-03-
MD-1530(TJW), MDL-1530, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26488, at *27-28, 68-69 (E.D. Tex.  
June 10, 2004). 
 50. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d at 596; Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Sirva, Inc., No. 04 
C 7644, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73375, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2006); Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 
431 F. Supp. 2d 823, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 51. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d at 596 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 52. See Fadem v. Ford Motor Co., No. 02 Civ. 0686 (CSH), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16898, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003). 
 53. See In re MSC Indus. Direct Co. Sec. Litig., 283 F. Supp. 2d 838, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 54. See Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73375, at *22-23. 
 55. See Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 777, 781-85 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(noting that an amended complaint’s failure to include the specific scope of the source’s 
responsibilities and the manner in which he came to know the information pled made the 
description insufficient); In re Fleming Cos. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26488, at *68-69 (holding that a complaint’s description of its confidential sources was 
778 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:769 
2.   The Holistic Approach  
 The second application of Novak that has emerged among the 
circuits adjusts the structure of the first approach and widens the 
analysis. This holistic approach, adopted by the First,56 Third,57 and
to a lesser extent, the Ninth58 Circuits, looks at a totality of the facts 
pled to determine whether or not they “provide an adequate basis for 
believing that the defendants’ statements were false.”59 In making 
this determination, the court will look to, among other things, “the 
level of detail provided by the confidential sources, the corroborative 
nature of the other facts alleged (including from other sources), the 
coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the number of sources, 
the reliability of the sources, and similar indicia.”60 This analysis 
examines both paths used in the original Novak approach but does 
not consider them separately; rather, it considers them to be 
components of  the totality of facts pled in determining whether or 
not those facts are sufficient to support a belief in the allegations 
pled on information and belief.61
 In applying this second approach, courts have provided some 
guidance as to what circumstances will and will not satisfy the 
holistic analysis. One factor that has proven crucial in establishing 
sufficiency is the degree of specificity present in information provided 
by confidential sources. In Sekuk Global Enterprises v. KVH 
Industries, the court concluded that statements by confidential 
informants (whose job titles were included in the pleadings) met 
PSLRA’s pleading requirement, in part, because of the level of 
specificity and corroboration provided.62 The confidential sources 
named a specific executive as making the orders in question as well 
                                                                                                                                       
sufficient because it included dates of employment, descriptions of job responsibilities, and 
a description of how each came to know the information pled). 
 56. See Mesko v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Sonus 
Networks Sec. Litig., No. 04-10294-DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28272, at *73-75 (D. 
Mass. May 10, 2006); In re Vertex Pharm., Inc., Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 2d 343, 353 (D. 
Mass. 2005). 
 57. See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126,146-47 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 58. Sparling v. Daou, 397 F.3d 704, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (adopting the analysis from 
Novak and indicating that it would use the factors listed in Cabletron to assess the 
reliability of confidential sources). 
 59. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 29 (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000)).  
 60. Id. at 29-30.  
 61. See id. at 32 (“Each securities fraud complaint must be analyzed on its own facts; 
there is no one-size-fits-all template. Sufficient evidence of one type might reduce or 
eliminate the need for evidence in other categories . . . .”). 
 62. No. 04-306ML, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16628, at *20-21 (D.R.I. Aug. 11, 2005) 
(pointing to specificity of job titles, volume of confidential sources, and consistency of 
accounts as the basis for the allegations’ sufficiency under PSLRA). 
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as the shipping company involved in the scheme.63 Similarly, 
corroboration of facts by other confidential or documentary sources 
has proven effective at overcoming PSLRA’s pleading requirements 
in these circuits. In Cabletron, the case most closely associated with 
the broader approach to Novak, the court noted the consistency of 
information provided by the plaintiff’s numerous confidential sources 
as a factor in satisfying the pleading standard.64
3.   The Permissive Holistic Approach 
 A third approach to the general Novak analysis adopted by the 
Tenth Circuit is a more permissive version of the holistic approach 
adopted by courts in cases like Cabletron.65 As in Cabletron and cases 
like it, this approach examines the facts in the pleading in their 
totality to determine whether a sufficient basis has been established 
to believe that the statements in question are false or misleading.66
This analysis makes that determination by considering the level of 
detail, the number and aggregate coherence of facts, and other 
factors suggesting that a reasonable person would find the 
statements in question false or misleading.67
 Whereas the other two approaches adopted by the circuits look for 
sufficient descriptions of confidential or documentary sources or some 
combination of the two, the Tenth Circuit approach, as illustrated in 
Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., does not strictly require that a 
plaintiff always reveal the source of the facts he or she pleads on 
information and belief.68 The court advanced three justifications for 
this position. First, the text of PSLRA does not expressly require 
plaintiffs to identify sources, but rather only requires supporting 
facts.69 Secondly, a requirement that plaintiffs always divulge their 
sources amounts to an evidentiary pleading requirement.70 Finally, 
the court reasoned that there would be circumstances in which the 
                                                                                                                                       
 63. Id.; see also Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 30 (describing statements from confidential 
sources as sufficient because they were “not conclusory allegations of fraud, but specific 
descriptions of the precise means through which it occurred”). 
 64. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 30; see also Pathfinder Mgmt., Inc. v. Mayne Pharma PTY, 
No. 06-CV-2204 (WJM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61081, at *31-32 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2008) 
(holding that a complaint pled sufficient particularity because the report of the company’s 
new comptroller corroborated allegations from a confidential informant).
 65. See Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1099-1101 (10th Cir. 2003).  
 66. Id. at 1099. 
 67. Id.
 68. Id. at 1101. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. At least one commentator has raised a similar concern that heightened factual 
pleading requirements of PSLRA may amount to a violation of plaintiffs’ Seventh 
Amendment rights. See generally Suja A. Thomas, The PSLRA’s Seventh Amendment 
Problem (U. Cin. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 07-03, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968893.
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allegations would be sufficiently verifiable, making personal or 
documentary sources simply unnecessary.71
 While Adams did not recognize a per se requirement that sources 
be identified, it did indicate that identification would strengthen  
the extent to which a complaint met the PSLRA pleading standard.72
The Tenth Circuit further cautioned that when an information and 
belief allegation does not identify the sources of its facts, “the facts 
alleged . . . will usually have to be particularly detailed, numerous, 
plausible, or objectively verifiable by the defendant before they will 
support a reasonable belief that the defendant’s statements were 
false or misleading.”73
IV.   ANALYSIS
A.   Special Considerations with Fabricated Sources 
 While the extent or even existence of fabricated sources 
unsurprisingly evades statistical capture, several factors unique to 
securities fraud litigation necessitate some level of assurance that 
confidential sources exist. The rush to file an initial complaint and 
serve as lead counsel for a securities class action suit encourages 
hastily crafted pleadings.74 Working against this objective is PSLRA’s 
requirement that plaintiffs plead their claims with particularity. 
Making this task even more onerous is the stay of discovery 
prompted by any pending motion to dismiss.75 For an unethical 
plaintiff, the acceptance of Novak’s premise that confidential sources 
must not always be named makes the fabrication of a confidential 
source a tempting shortcut through PSLRA’s potentially burdensome 
pleading standards. Though courts have been hesitant to directly 
accuse a plaintiff of this tactic, judges have raised the issue.76
B.   Potential Evaluative Pitfalls Stemming from Fabrication 
Concerns
 Concern that complaints are relying on fabricated confidential 
sources gives rise to judicial demand for assurances that confidential 
                                                                                                                                       
 71. Adams, 340 F.3d at 1102. 
 72. See id.
 73. Id. at 1103. 
 74. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL 
CORPORATE LAW § 16:101 (2d ed. 2009). 
 75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
 76. See Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (listing 
among the court’s potential concerns with regard to a set of confidential sources the 
possibility that “they don’t even exist”); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 193 
(4th Cir. 2007) (Shedd, J., dissenting) (proposing a less rigorous pleading standard by 
which plaintiffs simply plead “facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that [they] did 
not merely invent sources”). 
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sources represent actual persons. Thus, as a practical matter, the 
presence of these concerns means the existing analysis for satisfying 
PSLRA’s pleading standards must answer two questions:  
1) Does the complaint sufficiently support a belief that the 
confidential sources in question actually exist?; and  
2) Do the facts alleged by those confidential sources, if taken 
to be true, support a belief that the statements or omissions 
in questions were false or misleading?  
 The first step in this process makes investigations of confidential 
sources’ reliability intuitively appropriate. Such inquiries into 
truthfulness and accuracy are not uncommon. The Cabletron court 
included “reliability of the sources,” in its inexhaustive list of factors 
to consider in determining whether a complaint relying on 
confidential sources had met its pleading burden.77 It further listed 
consistency of information from confidential sources as a factor in 
favor of sufficiency because it “undermine[s] any argument that the 
complaint relies unduly on the stories of just one or two former 
employees, possibly disgruntled.”78 Although, based on the facts of 
Cabletron, reliability of the sources was a positive factor in satisfying 
the particularity requirement, the court’s language suggests that it 
would have granted the motion to dismiss had it been suspicious of 
the sources’ inclination for mendacity. The court in Sekulk was even 
bolder in its exploration of source credibility, indicating that 
corroboration of confidential sources’ statements is significant 
because it “reinforces the potential veracity of their allegations.”79
1.   Is Source Reliability an Acceptable Inquiry at the Pleading 
Stage? 
 Determining whether inquiries into source reliability are 
permissible requires a more precise interpretation of PSLRA’s “all 
facts” pleading requirement for allegations made on information and 
belief. As discussed, the broad acceptance of Novak means that courts 
have interpreted “all facts” as all facts necessary to support a belief in 
allegations made on information and belief. The operative question 
then becomes whether the facts necessary to support such a belief are 
those which logically support the allegation, or if “all facts” also 
encompasses facts which make the plaintiff trust the confidential 
                                                                                                                                       
 77. Mesko v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 78. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 79. Sekuk Global Enters. v. KVH Indus., Inc., No. 04-306ML, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16628 at *20-21 (D.R.I. Aug. 11, 2005). 
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source’s accuracy and honesty.80 Only if the latter is correct may a 
court appropriately engage in source reliability inquiries. Absent 
statutory guidance to the contrary, the standard level of judicial 
skepticism should be applied; that is, when considering a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, the court must apply a suspended level of 
skepticism and construe all pled facts as true.81
 Neither the text of PSLRA nor its legislative history suggests that 
any such contrary guidance or intent to depart from the standard 
approach is present. The Act provides that any defendant may move 
for dismissal of a complaint that fails to meet the pleading standards 
set forth in § 78u-4(b)(1) or (2).82 Since the mechanism for dismissal 
will still be a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the aforementioned suspended 
level of judicial skepticism must be applied to facts pled whether 
their source is confidential or otherwise. 
 PSLRA’s legislative history similarly suggests that Congress 
intended to raise pleading standards only with regard to the amount 
of facts required and not as to their credibility.83 Representative 
Christopher Cox clarified that the underlying facts which support an 
allegation need not be proven at the pleading stage: “First of all, we 
are talking today about allegations, so we do not need to know that 
they are true.”84 He went on to characterize the appropriate 
application of judicial scrutiny of the allegations: “[F]or purposes of 
judging the pleading, all the court does is assume all of the 
allegations are true even before you have actually proved them, and 
if added together, assuming their truthfulness, they would state a 
cause of action and you get by judgment on the pleadings . . . .”85
 Unlike the provisions covering the pleading of falsity, the 
applicable language governing the pleading of scienter requires that 
the facts “giv[e] rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”86 In Tellabs, the Supreme Court 
interpreted this language as requiring courts to consider “competing 
inferences” that can be drawn from the facts pled when determining 
whether scienter has been sufficiently shown.87 In a relatively recent 
                                                                                                                                       
 80. To put it another way, does “necessary facts” simply include specific facts that 
make the plaintiff believe the allegation or does it also encompass those facts which make 
the plaintiff believe the source is correct and telling the truth?  
 81. St. George v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 92-56287, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16869, at *2 (9th Cir. June 29, 1993); Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 
442 (5th Cir. 1986); 7-Eleven Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7 Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00140-B, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 94835, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008). 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
 83. 141 CONG. REC. 7264 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 84. Id.
 85. Id.
 86. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 87. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007). 
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decision, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Tellabs as requiring 
discounting information in pleadings attributed to confidential 
sources.88 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that competing inferences as 
to the reliability of the facts could not be made without knowledge of 
the source and his or her tendency to tell the truth.89 If this 
interpretation is correct, and the “strong inference” language of 
PSLRA’s scienter requirement provides for inquiries into source 
reliability, its absence from sections dealing with falsity further 
suggest that no such inquiry should be made when determining the 
sufficiency of facts supporting information and belief falsity 
allegations. Even if the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is incorrect 
and competing inferences are only to be made with regard to whether 
the facts presumed true sufficiently show the appropriate state of 
mind, it is clear that Congress intended courts to apply a lower level 
of scrutiny to the pleading of falsity than that of scienter.  
 Given the absence of contrary legislative instruction, courts must 
consider the motion to dismiss as they would any other—by taking 
facts pled as true and refraining from inquiries into their credibility 
or reliability. While reliability would be an important issue at trial, it 
is not an appropriate consideration when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss.90 A court’s judgment at the pleading stage as to 
the reliability of a confidential source must not substitute the 
judgment of the finder of fact and should not be included in an 
appropriate PSLRA analysis. Rather, in applying the appropriate 
standard to a determination of PSLRA’s pleading standards for 
allegations of falsity based on information and belief, the court must 
simply determine whether the facts pled, if true, support a belief in 
the allegation in question.91 In making this determination, courts 
                                                                                                                                       
 88. Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 89. Id. at 756-57 (“It is hard to see how information from anonymous sources could be 
deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of plausible opposing inferences. 
Perhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying.”). 
 90. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 n.8 (2007) (“[W]hen a complaint 
adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a . . . court’s assessment that 
the plaintiff will fail to . . . prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.”). 
 91. Although much has been made of the impact of Twombly on the factual 
requirements of pleadings, it has little impact on the determination of factual sufficiency 
here. Prior to Twombly, a complaint subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) was 
dismissed for failure to state a claim only when no conceivable set of facts could be proven 
that would support the plaintiff’s claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
Twombly now requires plaintiffs provide facts that “raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because complaints subject to PSLRA and 
Rule 9(b) are already required to provide all facts upon which their allegations are based, 
and courts are charged with determining whether or not those facts support the claim, the 
shift in Twombly does not impact the analysis. See also Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 
F.3d 162, 173 (4th Cir. 2007) (clarifying that the pre-Twombly standard did not apply to 
PSLRA claims in that “[t]he ‘all facts’ requirement is imposed . . . to determine the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint . . . . [A] complaint is legally sufficient if it ‘state[s] a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.’ . . . [U]nder the generally applicable notice pleading 
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should look to whether the facts alleged amount to specific 
allegations of fraud or whether they rise only to the level of formulaic 
boilerplate allegations (e.g., “they were lying”) or vague rumors. For 
example, an overly broad allegation from a confidential source of 
rumors relating to the falsity of a statement, even if taken to be 100% 
accurate, would only amount to the existence of that rumor and 
would not be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Such an 
assessment is in line with the standard of review discussed above as 
it does not purport to assess the credibility or accuracy of the facts. 
2.   May Courts Look for Assurances that Sources Actually Exist?  
 Given the aforementioned limitations on a court’s ability to 
inquire as to the reliability of confidential sources, the issue arises as 
to whether the court may seek assurances that confidential sources 
exist and are not fabricated. While courts must suspend their 
skepticism with regard to the accuracy of facts at the pleading stage, 
they may not do so in determining whether the facts pled amount to 
a cognizable claim. At the heart of an allegation pled on information 
and belief is the idea that the plaintiff does not have direct 
knowledge of the facts in question but has been informed of them by 
a source and believes that information.92 Thus, the fundamental issue 
of how a plaintiff generally came to be informed of the information 
pled is a crucial fact in support of a belief in the allegation in 
question. Here, the court is not determining whether the confidential 
source has given reason to justify the plaintiff’s belief in the 
information provided, but rather whether the plaintiff is, in fact, 
pleading an allegation on information and belief. To the extent that 
there is not a sufficient basis to believe that the plaintiff is informed 
and believes the allegations in question, the complaint is not 
factually sufficient as to that allegation. A court’s seeking of 
assurances that a confidential source is not fabricated does not 
constitute a reliability analysis as to that source—rather, it is a 
factual sufficiency determination as to the pleading itself. 
                                                                                                                                       
rules, this standard requires the court to ask whether any conceivable set of facts could be 
proved consistent with the complaint’s allegations that would permit relief to be granted. 
The PSLRA’s ‘all facts’ standard, however, changes the relevant set of facts for alleging 
misrepresentations and omissions to those alleged in the complaint. Under the PSLRA, 
therefore, our inquiry becomes whether, if those facts alleged in the complaint are true, 
relief could be granted on the plaintiffs’ claim.”) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Jonathan M. Hoff & Martin L. Seidel, Impact of ‘Twombly’ on Notice Pleading, N.Y.L.J., 
Sept. 13, 2007, at 4 (discussing the impact of Twombly on pleading the elements of 
securities fraud that are not already subject to heightened factual pleading standards on 
account of Rule 9(b) or PSLRA).  
 92. See supra note 23.  
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C.   A Two-Step Evaluation of Confidential Sources and Their Facts 
 The natural inclination to assuage concerns about source 
fabrication with impermissible evaluations of credibility and 
reliability would be significantly reduced by a two-step approach. 
Under such an analysis a court would look first for adequate 
assurances that the sources do in fact exist. After finding such 
assurances the court’s analysis would move to the second step to 
determinate whether the facts provided by the sources support a 
belief in the allegations in question.  
1.   Adequate Assurances 
 The first part in this two-step analysis can be satisfied so long 
as the court’s analysis does not shift from a factual evaluation of 
whether the source exists to a reliability analysis of whether the 
source is to be believed. Thus, a range of possibilities exists.93 The 
positional aspect of the original Novak approach (evaluation of 
whether the confidential source is sufficiently described to support 
a belief that a person similarly situated would have access to the 
information pled) is one option so long as it is applied with 
limitations. A plaintiff could provide a sufficiently detailed 
description of how its confidential source came to know the 
information in question. Here, the court would not look at whether 
these details suggest the source was reasonably well informed. 
Rather, it would determine if the description was sufficiently 
detailed to render discovery ineffective for finding and producing a 
witness with the described back story if the case made it through 
pleading and the source was in fact fabricated. Details beyond how 
the source came to know the information could also be pled to 
achieve the same effect of narrowing the possible field of sources.94
Such details could assuage concerns about source fabrication 
without a need for the court to indulge in overreaching 
assessments of the information’s credibility.  
 Consideration of the level of detail provided by the confidential 
source may also be of use in this phase of the analysis. As with a 
unique description of the source, this factor may only be considered 
for its tendency to suggest a nonfictitious source. That is to say, a 
                                                                                                                                       
 93. Though not provided for by PSLRA, an in-camera presentation of the source’s 
identity is one judicial tool that could be considered in addition to the pleading of 
additional facts to assure the court that confidential sources have not been fabricated. 
 94. For instance, a description of a confidential source which states that the 
individual was employed by the defendant during a specific time, was involved at a 
management level, attended the University of Florida, and has green eyes might not be 
enough information to expose the source to reprisal, but it would likely narrow the pool 
enough to dash the plans of a plaintiff who hopes to find a source in discovery who can 
provide the information attributed to a fabricated source at the pleading stage. 
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high level of factual detail is likely to come from an actual source and 
not be a product of fabrication. Further, if the information was the 
product of source fabrication, discovery would be unlikely to produce 
a source that could speak to the details at trial. To be clear, the level 
of detail provided should not be considered for its tendency to show 
that, by virtue of lack of details, the confidential source is mistaken 
or is being dishonest. The inference, for example, that a confidential 
source’s lack of details on a particular matter suggests that she is ill-
informed, exaggerating her knowledge of the issue, or is otherwise 
mistaken would amount to an impermissible assessment of source 
reliability at the pleading stage.  
2.   Sufficiency of Facts 
 In the next stage of the analysis, courts would determine whether 
the facts pled, if true, support a belief in the allegation in question. 
This second step should only be undertaken once the court 
determines that the plaintiff has pled facts which provide sufficient 
assurance that its confidential sources are not fictitious. Having 
made this determination, courts may evaluate the facts pled with the 
appropriate level of suspended skepticism and without lingering 
intuitive concern over the potential nonexistence of confidential 
sources. Having culled dubious sources and their attendant facts in 
the first stage of the analysis, the court may proceed with a 
straightforward assessment of the facts. The appropriate analysis 
would be the same as that applied to any motion to dismiss except 
that the court would look to the facts pled rather than contemplating 
the complaint in terms of any plausible set of facts.95 This analysis 
should examine the level of specificity provided by the facts to 
determine whether or not they support a belief in the allegation 
made on information and belief. The application of this standard is 
not only in line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is also 
consistent with Congress’s aim of reforming private securities 
litigation law without placing undue burden on meritorious cases.96
V.   CONCLUSION
 Demand for assurances that confidential sources are real and the 
potential for overstepping, inherent in the existing approaches to 
Novak, increase the appeal of such a two-step analysis. Further, an 
independent step which focuses on culling fabricated sources serves 
                                                                                                                                       
 95. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 96. S. REP. NO.104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689. 
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PSLRA’s policy objective of combating strike suits that seek to use 
discovery as a “fishing expedition.”97
 This Note has argued that inquiries into the reliability or 
credibility of confidential sources used to plead falsity in federal 
securities litigation are prohibited by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and counter to the legislative intent of PSLRA. To address 
the very real concern of fabricated sources in such actions, this Note 
has also proposed a two-step process for use in determining whether 
a complaint subject to PSLRA which relies on confidential sources for 
its allegations of falsity may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 
plead with sufficient particularity. This process looks first for 
sufficient assurances that the confidential sources are, in fact, real 
and then determines whether the facts stated by those sources 
support a sufficient basis for believing the allegations made on 
information and belief. Such a two-step approach is consistent with 
PSLRA’s twin legislative objectives of combating strike suits while 
preserving the deterrence and enforcement function provided by 
private securities litigation. It does so by separately addressing the 
unique potential for fabrication presented by complaints relying on 
confidential witnesses such that courts may review the pled facts of 
the case without a level of skepticism beyond that permitted by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This proposed analysis is not 
fundamentally at odds with existing approaches applied throughout 
the circuits. Rather, it restructures the analysis in the hope of 
keeping separate two decidedly disparate considerations: (1) the 
existence of the confidential sources and (2) the facts’ tendency to 
support a belief in the allegations made on information and belief. By 
deconstructing and separating the existing analysis, this approach 
enables courts to determine the sufficiency of the pled facts, free from 
otherwise very reasonable concerns regarding fabricated sources. An 
analysis that rigorously keeps out fictitious confidential sources, 
without inappropriately raising the level of scrutiny for facts pled, 
achieves a balance between combating strike suits and encouraging 
meritorious claims. In doing so, this approach threads the policy 
needle and achieves a result in line with PSLRA’s objectives. 
                                                                                                                                       
 97. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736. 
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